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Abstract
A variant of the von Neumann-Wigner Interpretation is proposed.. It does not make use of the familiar  language of wave func-
tions and observers.  Instead it pictures  the state of the physical world as a vector in a Fock space  and, therefore  not, literally, a
function of any spacetime coordinates.  And, rather  than segregating consciousness into individual points of view (each carrying
with it  a  sense  of its  proper  time),  this  model proposes only unitary states  of  consciousness,  Q(t),  where  t  represents  a  fiducial
time with respect to which both the state of the physical world and the state of consciousness evolve. This would seem to impose
a preferred Lorentz frame on the world. But it will be argued that no physical violations of relativity are engendered thereby.
Introduction.
The relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics has long been discussed in a serious context.
Schrödinger (1), Wigner (2), and von Neumann (3) were, early on, most associated with these lines of investiga-
tion. And Everett's Relative State Interpretation is very much about our states of consciousness. Still, it seems
that little effort has gone into developing mathematical formalisms appropriate to the description of this relation-
ship. Perhaps this is because mental states seem mathematically indefinable. In this paper I will try to incorpo-
rate  consciousness  into  a  straightforward generalization of  ordinary quantum physics.  It  is  both  possible and
illustrative to do this.
States of the World.
Designate the state of the physical world as |Y(t)>. Such states are to be understood as vectors in a Fock space.
Vectors in this space are constructed from the vacuum state |0> by the repeated application of creation opera-
tors appropriate to the various kinds of particles that inhabit our universe. The parameter t recognizes that this
state evolves with respect to a fiducial time that we can identify with a particular  Lorentz frame. It is essential
to recognize that |Y(t)> is not a function of the spatial coordinates (x, y, z). We will work in the Dirac Interac-
tion  Picture.  Here  we  regard  our  Fock  space  as  built  using  the  creation  operators  appropriate  to  free,  non-
interacting particles and write ä  ¶t È YHtL > = H ' È Y HtL > where H' is the Hamiltonian describing the interac-
tions amongst these particles. The complete Hamiltonian for the system is  written H = H0  + H'.  Every effort
will  be made not  to express anything in terms of 'wave functions.'  It has been recognized that this  concept is
problematic since the inception of quantum field theory (4). 
There are, of course, circumstances where the wave function idea works adequately and provides useful
answers  to  practical questions.  Mostly these  are  circumstances under  which an  experiment can be conducted
where only one or a very few particles do something interesting and are observed. The observer can, in these
fortunate  circumstances, be  absorbed into  the  background without  much mathematical consequence. (Experi-
mental  physicists  work  diligently  to  construct  such  situations.)  But  our  tendency  to  mistake  these  artificial
situations for reality has introduced a host of seeming paradoxes.
States of Consciousness.
Suppose that,  at any time t,  the conscious state of the universe can be designated as Q HtL.  Q HtL  describes the
qualia  -  the totality of sensations experienced by any and all consciousness anywhere at that time; that could
include physicists recording a quantum measurement or worms tasting sugar in a pond on a distant planet. We
will  try  not  to  make  particular  distinctions  between  various  "observers."  Proceeding  in  analogy to  quantum
mechanics we suppose that there are 'states of consciousness' and that these states can be represented as vectors
in our Fock space. There acts upon this space a linear 'consciousness operator'– C– which   has the property that,
for some of these vectors,
 
1)    C |Ci> = Qi |Ci> .
The |Ci> constitute eigenvectors of C– they  correspond to what we will call definite states of consciousness. By
this  we mean that  Qi  specifies  a  unique  and  unambiguous  state  of  awareness possessed by the  totality of  its
sentient  observers. Now it  is  immediately clear what a strange sort  of "operator" C  is.  We are accustomed to
seeing  c-numbers  as  eigenvalues,  maybe  a  few  other  things,  but  sensations?  We  assign  C  no  explicit  time
dependence. Any state that is not an eigenstate of C will be called a mixed state.
There  should  be  no  segregation  of  consciousness  into  any  set  of  individual  observers.  We  will  just
designate it Q(t). This will prevent us from trying to describe the world in terms of separable and independent
"wave functions," one for your brain, my brain, or other things; it would be difficult having to make sense of
trillions  of  independent  consciousness  operators.  While  it  is  true  that  we  seem  to  experience  our  individual
conscious states independently, we have to argue that this apparent separateness is merely an illusion born of
facts like "I" can remember my memories but not "yours." And "I" can experience my sensation of blue but not
"yours." These facts are indisputable, and surely interesting. But they only obscure matters if we wish to study
the problem at hand. And we do not want to be misinterpreted as proposing anything mystical here. The impor-
tant point is mathematical– we  will regard consciousness (in its totality) as something that can be indexed by a
single parameter t.
We want these states of consciousness to stand in some relation to those of the material world. We will
say that every |Ci> is identical with a particular physical state vector and that the |Ci> constitute a complete set
of orthonormal basis states in terms of which any |Y(t)> may be decomposed. Regarding the nature of the |Ci>
one thing is obvious; they are highly degenerate with respect to the Qi. It would, for instance, make no differ-
ence to the overall state of consciousness whether an electron had been originally created in a region with no
observers.  And  we  must  recognize  a  sort  of  null  state  of  consciousness—a  state  where  there  just  aren't  any
sentient observers at all. (The state vector a few seconds after the big bang would correspond to such a state. So
would  many  others.)  So  we  must  picture  the  states  |Ci>  as  existing  in  a  space  that  is  broken  up  into  many
separate subspaces each with a particular Qi  that designates the unique conscious experience corresponding to
it.  We will  denote these subspaces Ci.  Recalling that  every state |Y>  can be written as a superposition of the
states |Ci>, and knowing that every region having Qi in common must be spanned by a number (ni) of the |Ci>,
we can write:
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 represents the j-th state in our Fock space that corresponds to one of the ni  eigenvectors |Ci> that span the
subspace Ci  (5). We sum over these subspaces.  Since C does not depend on t, neither do the Fij. It should be
remembered that  two states  that  are  eigenstates of  C  having different  qualia-eigenvalues must  necessarily be
orthogonal to one another.
The time variable that appears in |Y(t)> and Q(t) requires a comment. As it pertains to the former case it
causes  no  problems with  relativity  since  the  equations  that  determine  the  evolution  of  |Y(t)>  are  themselves
relativistically invariant—t  only  represents  an  arbitrary choice  of  Lorentz  frame.  Q(t)  does  cause  a  problem,
however. By choosing not to regard consciousness as broken up into separate observers (each of which needing
to be assigned its  own proper time) we have more-or-less forced ourselves to select a particular set of space-
like  hypersurfaces to  designate  the  various 't's.  Now perhaps because consciousness is  a  non-material  sort  of
thing such a violation of relativity is permissible—we  can't be sure how physics treats non-material things. But
it is essential that we construe Q(t) in such a way as to end up with no physical violations of relativity.
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The Evolution of these States with Time.
Taking  no  account  of  consciousness  we  could  picture  |Y(t)>  evolving  according  to  ä
¶t È Y HtL > = H ' HtL È Y HtL >  where  H '  designates  the  interaction  operator  for  the  material  world.  (H'(t)  =
Ù H ' HtL â3 x  where H' (t) is the corresponding Hamiltonian density operator). We assume normal ordering. All
operators and state vectors are being represented in the Interaction Picture. There would, in consequence, exist
a unitary operator, U(t2, t1), having the property that |Y(t2)> = U(t2, t1) |Y(t1)> . Let us imagine the world at time
t1  being in  a  definite  state  of  consciousness. That  is  to  say |Y(t1)  > can be written  as  Sj=1
ni
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specific i. Qi, to which the Fij  all correspond, is understood to designate a definite state of consciousness. Now
the Fi
j
 are not in  any necessary way eigenstates of H0 or H '.  |Y(t1)> will,  therefore, evolve into a state vector
having no particular Qi specified. Under this scenario we can write |Y(t2) > as S
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some probability of finding the conscious state of the world in any of quite a number of configurations. But this
is  never  what  we  seem to  experience;  our  common awareness  appears  unconfused  and  composed of  a  well-
defined set of qualia. So let us suppose that reality will only tolerate definite states of consciousness– that  is to
say |Y(t)> must always lie entirely within one of the eigenspaces of C. 
We can arrange for this to happen by amending the previous equation for the time-evolution of È YHtL >
to read  S È Y HtL > = ÈY(t) > where S is a (non-linear) operator having the property:
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  at random with the probability S
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 |Α ji È2 for all specific i (N is only for
normalization).
S, in other words, functions as a projection operator taking mixed states (with respect to C) into definite states
of consciousness. We give up the idea of a unitary time-evolution operator. Such an operator has an inverse.
We cannot go backwards in time according to Eqn 3) since the decision how to go forward is made at random.
This  imparts  a  natural  directionality to  time.  S2  =  S  and  S  has  no  explicit  time dependence.  Since  |Y(t)> is
always  an  eigenstate  of  C  we  may write  C  |Y(t)>  =  Q(t)  |Y(t)>.  The  qualia-state  is  assumed  independent  of
phase so, if |Y(t)> corresponds to a particular Qi, ãä Θ |Y(t)> will correspond to it also. We suppose that C |0> = Φ
|0> where Φ designates the null state of consciousness. 
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The Anatomy of a Measurement.
Consider  a  very simple experiment in  which an  electron is  sent  through a  Stern-Gerlach apparatus. It can be
prepared as either spin-up or spin-down or in any superposition of these states. If it comes in spin-up it always
veers up and strikes a detector that causes a light to shine green. If it's  down it  goes the other way and a red
light is triggered. This device, the electron whose spin it measures, and something like an observer, constitute a
physical  universe  described  by |Y(t)>.  The  conscious  states  of  this  universe,  we  will  imagine,  belong to  this
single observer whose only possible states of awareness are 1) seeing a green color, 2) seeing a red color, or 3)
seeing nothing (the null-state of consciousness). So the space in which the conscious state of the universe is a
vector  contains  three  subspaces– one  corresponding  to  each  of  the  above  possibilities.  These  are  the  eigen-
spaces defined by C. Each is spanned by a number of eigenvectors of C, each of these a state |Y>  in the Fock
space characterizing the physical world. Since this world is simple we think that we can get away with describ-
ing it in a simple manner. Let us describe its initial state as |Y(0)> = |+, I> where + says that our electron is spin-
up. 'I' simply says that the rest of the measurement system ("observer" and all) are in their initial state. C|Y(0)>
= Φ |Y(0)>  since this initial state is an eigenstates of C corresponding to the null-state of consciousness. When
the spin-up electron is detected at td  |Y(0)>  evolves into  |Y( td)> which we can write as |+, G>. C|Y(td)> = G
|Y(td)> meaning that this new state is an eigenvector corresponding to the qualia 'seeing a green color.' (If the
election had been spin-down, relative to our arbitrary coordinate system, we'd have ended up with a red qualia
and a state |-, R>.) If things happen to start out as (|+, I> + |-, I>)/ 2 our system will, obviously, evolve into a
superposition of states which is no longer an eigenvector of C. Since, according to the above-mentioned princi-
ple,  reality  cannot  tolerate  any  state  that  is  not  an  eigenstate  of  C  it  is  necessary that  S  project  |Y( td)>  into
either  |+, G> or  |-, R> with equal probability. Let us make it clear that no wave function collapses. Instead, a
state  vector  |Y(t)>– which is  not  a  function  of  the  spatial  coordinates  (x,  y,  z)– tries to  evolve into  a  state  (in
Fock space) where it no longer resides entirely within a particular Ci but rather exists as a superposition of 'red'
and  'green'  qualia  states.  S  immediately  corrects  this  by  projecting  |Y(t)>  back  into  only  one  of  the  definite
states of consciousness available to it according to Eqn 3). 
There is something undeniably awkward about such a phenomenon. And it is not obvious that adjoin-
ing consciousness to the problem by way of S does much to improve things. Everett elects to throw out S and
freely  allow  non-definite  states  of  consciousness.  These  are,  presumably,  able  to  sort  themselves  out  into
separate,  conscious  worlds.  Clever  as  the  Relative-State  Interpretation  is,  it  suffers  from  a  serious  problem.
Suppose that the electron is sent out in such a state that the green light should illuminate 99% of the time and
the red one only 1%. I know perfectly well that, in situations like this, I will see the green light almost all the
time.  But  one  cannot  be  "just  a  little  bit  conscious."  One  either  is  or  one  isn't.  If  there  are  two  conscious
"observers"– one seeing  green  and  one  seeing  red– there ought,  really,  to  be  a  50/50  chance  of  "my"  being
either. In fact, there does not seem to be a satisfactory solution to this inconsistency (6). For this reason we will
want to reject the Everett Interpretation and not burden ourselves with the uneconomical existence of realities
we can have no contact with or knowledge of. 
Since  S  seems to  measure the  state  vector constantly (7)  a  concern may arise regarding the  quantum
Zeno effect; if the state is always being observed can it  really ever go from null  to green or red? The answer
would seem to be 'yes' as a deceptively simple example will  demonstrate: Consider a universe with only one
spatial dimension. In it  there exists  a special particle (there is  only one particle of this  type in the entire uni-
verse and it can never decay away) whose state, with respect to H0  can be decomposed into momentum eigen-
states |k>. There is also an observer coupled to a momentum-measuring device. (We assume that its measure-
ments disrupt the special particle's momentum in only an insignificant way.) Let us suppose that the conscious-
ness eigenstates of interest here are two in number, red and green. If N £  k  < N + 1 (N Î  Z) for N even the
observer sees green. For N odd he sees red. Let us now subject the special particle to a force which causes it to
accelerate so that, if it is in a state |k> at t = 0, a later time t will see it in |k + t>. If the particle starts out in state
|1/2> it will, at t = 1/2, cross the boundary from a green qualia-state into a red one. If the particle started out,
say, in the state (|1/3> + |2/3>)/ 2  initially all is well because we are in a green eigenstate. But at t = 1/3 part
of the vector crosses into the red eigenspace and a mixed state tries to occur. S immediately projects this into
one of the available possibilities with equal likelihood. After this the chosen state continues to evolve normally.
While seeming a bit unphysical, we do think this example captures what takes place in reality. It illustrates the
"hard-edged" nature of the boundaries of the qualia eigenspaces Ci. In order for the consciously evolving world
we live in  to be possible (according to this  interpretation) a state vector must  be able cross from one Ci  to  a
different  one,  or  into  a  superposed state  residing  primarily in  a  different  one,  instantaneously. And  note  that
eigenstates in two different Ci must be orthogonal to one another. 
We will define continuous time-evolution in our Fock space as follows:
4)  Limit
Dt®0
< HYHt + DtL - YHtLL È HYHt + DtL - YHtLL > = 0 for all t.
Clearly this equation cannot hold if physics is to admit of consciousness under our assumptions. (The action of
S upon a mixed state will violate this.) But let us consider the most flagrant violation of continuous evolution–
that being the instantaneous transit of Y( t) into an orthogonal state. Here the left-hand side of Eqn 4) goes to 2.
If we write YHt + DtL  as ã-ä H ' Dt  Y(t)  »  (1 - ä H ' DtL YHtL.  The left  hand side of Eqn 4) becomes Limit
Dt®0
 <Y(t) |
H '2  | Y(t)> Dt2. Certainly this will go to zero with Dt unless <Y(t) | H '2  | Y(t)> is infinite. (If it is finite <Y( t) |
H '2  | Y(t)> » Τz-2, in many situations. Τz  represents the Zeno time– a  period during which the probability of a
state's remaining the same decreases quadratically with time. It is during this period that frequent observations
will inhibit a state's evolution.) We can see the same thing through a different argument. Consider  Limit
Dt®0
 <Y(t) |
Y(t+Dt)>. For the above-described instantaneous transit to occur this must be 0. But write  |Y( t+Dt)> as ã-ä H ' Dt
|Y(t)> and expand. If all the <Y(t) | H ' n | Y(t)> terms are finite the limit will be 1 as Dt goes to 0. 
But  it  occurs to  us  that  <Y( t)  |  H '2  |  Y(t)>  is,  in  fact  infinite.  Y(t)  represents the  entire  universe (and
cosmology tells  us  this  is  very likely infinite).  <Y( t)  |  H '2  |  Y(t)> therefore includes  the  (squared) interaction
energies between infinitely many particles. For the universe, considered as a whole, Τz  = 0. For it there can be
no quadratic regime or quantum Zeno effect.  
Now the quantum Zeno effect has been experimentally demonstrated. It is a real thing. How can this be
possible? When physicists measure this effect they isolate a small "part" of the larger state vector in such a way
as to segregate it from the wider world. (Perhaps they put the whole measuring system, observer, and decaying
atom inside a finite-dimensional lead box.) And they arrange things so that only one particle is doing anything
interesting. Under these circumstances terms like <Y( t) | H '2  | Y(t)> are easily taken to be finite and the effect
can be observed (8).
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Consider  a  very simple experiment in  which an  electron is  sent  through a  Stern-Gerlach apparatus. It can be
prepared as either spin-up or spin-down or in any superposition of these states. If it comes in spin-up it always
veers up and strikes a detector that causes a light to shine green. If it's  down it  goes the other way and a red
light is triggered. This device, the electron whose spin it measures, and something like an observer, constitute a
physical  universe  described  by |Y(t)>.  The  conscious  states  of  this  universe,  we  will  imagine,  belong to  this
single observer whose only possible states of awareness are 1) seeing a green color, 2) seeing a red color, or 3)
seeing nothing (the null-state of consciousness). So the space in which the conscious state of the universe is a
vector  contains  three  subspaces– one  corresponding  to  each  of  the  above  possibilities.  These  are  the  eigen-
spaces defined by C. Each is spanned by a number of eigenvectors of C, each of these a state |Y>  in the Fock
space characterizing the physical world. Since this world is simple we think that we can get away with describ-
ing it in a simple manner. Let us describe its initial state as |Y(0)> = |+, I> where + says that our electron is spin-
up. 'I' simply says that the rest of the measurement system ("observer" and all) are in their initial state. C|Y(0)>
= Φ |Y(0)>  since this initial state is an eigenstates of C corresponding to the null-state of consciousness. When
the spin-up electron is detected at td  |Y(0)>  evolves into  |Y( td)> which we can write as |+, G>. C|Y(td)> = G
|Y(td)> meaning that this new state is an eigenvector corresponding to the qualia 'seeing a green color.' (If the
election had been spin-down, relative to our arbitrary coordinate system, we'd have ended up with a red qualia
and a state |-, R>.) If things happen to start out as (|+, I> + |-, I>)/ 2 our system will, obviously, evolve into a
superposition of states which is no longer an eigenvector of C. Since, according to the above-mentioned princi-
ple,  reality  cannot  tolerate  any  state  that  is  not  an  eigenstate  of  C  it  is  necessary that  S  project  |Y( td)>  into
either  |+, G> or  |-, R> with equal probability. Let us make it clear that no wave function collapses. Instead, a
state  vector  |Y(t)>– which is  not  a  function  of  the  spatial  coordinates  (x,  y,  z)– tries to  evolve into  a  state  (in
Fock space) where it no longer resides entirely within a particular Ci but rather exists as a superposition of 'red'
and  'green'  qualia  states.  S  immediately  corrects  this  by  projecting  |Y(t)>  back  into  only  one  of  the  definite
states of consciousness available to it according to Eqn 3). 
There is something undeniably awkward about such a phenomenon. And it is not obvious that adjoin-
ing consciousness to the problem by way of S does much to improve things. Everett elects to throw out S and
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separate,  conscious  worlds.  Clever  as  the  Relative-State  Interpretation  is,  it  suffers  from  a  serious  problem.
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either. In fact, there does not seem to be a satisfactory solution to this inconsistency (6). For this reason we will
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we can have no contact with or knowledge of. 
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The EPR Paradox.
There must be no physical contradiction between S, Q(t) and special relativity. If such a contradiction is to be
found,  the  most obvious place to  look for  it  is  in  the  EPR paradox. Suppose that  our  universe is  enlarged to
consist of two detectors, two "observers," and a source that can fire a pair of particles whose spins are anticorre-
lated. They go off in opposite directions toward the detectors. These detectors are imagined to be aligned. Let
the initial state, |Y(0)>  be described as |(+, -), (I, I)>. Let the observer-detector system on the left experience a
green sensation at td1.  |Y(td1)> is  now ||(+, -),  (G, I)>. At a later time, td2,  the other observer sees red and we
have |Y(td2)> = |(+, -), (G, R)>. So far the worst problem seems to be that a signal is sent from the first observer
to the second (perhaps faster than light) without any obvious mechanism. The thing to recognize is that |Y(t)> is
not a function of the (x, y, z) spatial coordinates whatsoever. It is a vector in a Fock space. Such measurements
as may pertain to its evolution do not take place in physical space at all. That they do take place with respect to
the fiducial parameter t is a source of concern since this seems to give preference to a specific Lorentz frame.
But  let  us also take note of the fact that,  in  all  this  measurement, no transfer of actual information has taken
place (the No-Communication Theorem). Indeed, no physical thing has occurred that violates relativity. And it
would  be  unthinkable  that  our  second  "observer"  experienced  green  since  that  outcome would  have  to  have
|Y(t)> evolving into two, mutually incompatible futures for the particles' spins. (If the entire picture seems to
speak of a certain non-locality in  physics, so be it.  There is  ample and well-known experimental evidence to
prove that such correlations do exist.)
A question will arise as to which of the red or green qualia actually  occurred first. Wanting to ascribe
some reality to Q(t)  we believe this question to have an answer. But we have no way of determining it. If we
are observers looking at the above experiment from a rocket ship we might, depending on our state of motion,
see either the red or green color first. If we happen to be stationary in the preferred frame we will see the green
color first  and conclude that the state vector projected and was in its new condition throughout the hypersur-
faces of greater t. Someone else, moving otherwise, may imagine that the state vector projected with the percep-
tion  of  the  red  color  and  that  the  (necessary)  green  color  was  only  seen  later.  (Both  of  these  observers  just
contribute to the larger Q(t).)  Now the second one is "wrong" but there can be no way of demonstrating this.
We can propose all sorts of additional measurements that might have been made in one region of spacetime or
another  so  as  to  verify "when"  the  state  vector really projected.  But  these  measurements were not  made and
quantum  mechanics  does  not  recognize  contrafactual  definiteness.  If  they  had  been  made  we'd  have  had  a
different  problem and  it  would  have  to  be  analyzed differently.  Since  we assume that  our  underlying theory
obeys microcausality, no physical measurement event can have physical consequences outside its future light-
cone.  And  the  light-cone  structure  of  spacetime  is  invariant  under  Lorentz  transformations.  Therefore  no
physical experiment can be devised that would identify the preferred frame.
Conclusion.
By replacing wave functions with states in Fock space, |Y(t)>, we have created an interpretive picture that is in
better  agreement  with  the  view adopted  by physics since  the  inception  of  modern  field  theory in  the  1950s.
Unfortunately,  much  of  the  philosophical  discussion  related  to  quantum physics originated  in  the  1920s  and
30s, before relativistically correct models had been developed. 
A price to be paid for this  "better agreement" is  the acceptance of a unitary view of consciousness in
which  the  idea  of  individual  observers  is  ignored.  Peculiar  as  this  may  seem,  it  does  not  bring  with  it  any
observable consequences. But it allows us to refer to an instantaneous consciousness-state (qualia-state) of the
universe as Q(t). We have to do this if we want to put such a state into relation with |Y(t)>.
The fiducial time parameter t  is taken directly from the Interaction Picture and is, as discussed above,
arbitrary. Although it appears to violate relativity by singling out a preferred Lorentz frame, this results in no
observable, physical, events that contradict relativity. Instead, it frees us from trying to make sense of a multi-
tude of separated  consciousnesses each observing the world through the lens of its own proper time.
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